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Many governments in developing countries have designed programs 
to increase food production but not all plans have proved successful 
in their execution. To some extent the problem may relate to the 
process, of planning itself. Government plans define a set of programs 
which it is believed will stimulate economic growth in the rural 
sector. Such plans obviously include options thought conducive to 
increased crop yields. Indeed, it may be the explicit intention of 
the planners to restrain the peasant from certain options that are 
considered unproductive and to redirect him towards new and more 
"productive" patterns of behavior. The government administrator in 
the field must explain the plan and convince the peasant to act 
within its limits. The peasant's response may not be entirely 
positive, he may feel more confident and secure in following tradi­
tional agricultural practices. This sets the stage for a conflict 
between the administrator--who wants to implement plans which estab­
lish definite limits upon action--and the peasant--who attempts 
to preserve his autonomy and thereby his capacity to follow his own 
self-defined pattern of choices.
The dogged resistance of the peasantry, impoverished and con­
servative in outlook, can easily sap the patience if not subvert the 
economic plans of a government bent upon introducing modern methods 
of agricultural production. Under pressure to achieve production 
targets, officials frequently resort to more subtle tactics of 
bureaucratic intimidation to quell peasant opposition. The very 
fact that such bureaucratic methods can and are frequently employed 
is indicative of a structural imbalance, characteristic of many new 
nations, by which a dynamic urban-centered bureaucracy holds sway 
over an unorganized and languid rural populace. More importantly, 
however, this imbalance can be reflected in the very process of 
economic and social planning itself. Urban technocrats often base 
plans on the most modern technology without much forethought about 
how such innovations can be adapted to existing rural conditions.
Even if technical and administrative policies are carefully designed 
to take into account rural conditions, the interests of the urban- 
dominated economy may still prevent any attempt to provide the 
economic incentives necessary for a positive peasant response.
One must acknowledge that peasant opposition to participation 
in government programs may have some basis in political, technological 
and economic issues and cannot be set aside as another instance of 
"irrational" commitment to the immutable laws of village existence. 
This is not to dismiss entirely the impact of village traditions 
and cultural factors or their role in inhibiting the adoption of more 
effective methods of agricultural production. The current critical 
contest and dispute between peasant and administrator in Indonesia 
resulted from plans being implemented in the rural sector which were 




In the post-colonial era, Indonesian political leaders have 
frequently set self-sufficiency in rice production as a national 
goal, and several government programs have been undertaken to achieve 
this objective. This was particularly true in the 1960’s as increas­
ingly large quantities of foreign currency were expended to purchase 
rice on the world market because domestic production was insufficient. 
Indonesian leaders have been quite aware of the potentially disastrous 
consequences'both economically and politically should they ignore con­
sumption needs, particularly in urban areas, for a basic commodity 
like rice. Nevertheless, the goal of attaining self-sufficiency has 
continued to elude government administrators.
Under the five year plan of 1969 (Repelita) , central attention 
in plans for modernizing the rural economy was focussed on rice pro­
duction. President Suharto has been unbending in the commitment 
that, by 1973, Indonesia will be self-sufficient in rice. The cur­
rent program to achieve this goal is named Bimas and is the most 
discussed and controversial aspect of contemporary public policy in 
Indonesia.1 Press coverage on this program alone has far exceeded 
that given to the entire five year plan. The program,by virtue of 
its size, requires the participation of millions of peasant farmers, 
particularly on Java.2 The government has saturated the more fertile 
areas of Java with credits in the form of fertilizers, pesticides, 
seeds and other items needed to increase rice production. Several 
foreign firms from Germany, Switzerland and Japan have contracted 
with the Indonesian government to supply these items, and, in some 
cases, they have participated in the administration of the program 
itself. The process of implementing the Bimas program has high­
lighted some serious and pervasive problems in government adminis­
tration. Few administrative reforms were undertaken to prepare govern 
ment organizations to carry out the Bimas program. As a result de­
partments continue to lack the personnel and skills required by such
1. Bimas as used in this discussion refers specifically to the Bimas 
Gotong Rojong Program, the national economic development program 
in rice production, the goals for which were developed in 1968 
and are spelled out in the five year plan.
The guidelines for the Bimas program were first formulated 
by the Institut Pertanian Bogor (Institute of Agriculture in 
Bogor) and tested by students from that Institute in a pilot 
project in 1963-64 in the district of Krawang, West Java. The 
initial name given to the project was Demas (Demonstrasi Massal 
or Mass Demonstration). In 1964-65, the project was financed and 
sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and the size of the pro­
gram expanded. In 1965, when the government adopted the project 
as the primary program in rice production, the name was changed to 
Bimas (Bimbingan Massal or Mass Guidance) and was referred to as 
Bimas Nasional or National Bimas. In 1968, when foreign firms as­
sumed some responsibility for the program, a new name was given to 
this program: Bimas Gotong Rojong. Bimas Gotong Rojong is now
considered a program separate and distinct from Bimas Nasional.
For the past two years, efforts at increasing rice production have 
been centered in the Bimas Gotong Rojong program rather than the 
Bimas Nasional program.
2. The Bimas program has been expanded to include parts of Sumatra and
Sulawesi? but its emphasis continues to be upon increasing rice pro duction in Java.
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a massive agricultural development program. These problems soon be­
came apparent as the Bimas Gotong Rojong program began operations, 
in the wet season of 1968-69, and then expanded, during the 1969 
dry season and again in the 1969-70 wet season. For example, poor 
communications and a weak government bureaucracy contributed to the 
tardy delivery of the Bimas fertilizer and pesticides to the villages.
A shortage of extension workers made it impossible to instruct and 
supervise the peasant adequately in the use of fertilizer and 
pesticides. As a result, the peasant frequently did not attain the 
promised increase in rice yields, and, moreover, he was now saddled 
with the repayment of the credit that the government extended to him. 
Many peasants have been unwilling or unable to repay the Bimas 
credits.3 For many reasons, then, peasant dissatisfaction with the 
Bimas program has increased. Some of this stems from deficiencies 
intrinsic to the program. From the peasant's point of view, the 
government has been too inflexible. Based on years of experience in 
his particular area, the peasant has his own ideas about what he 
needs to increase rice yields and also how much should be used. The 
government, however,insists upon giving the same standard package for 
all areas allowing only limited variations in its contents. From 
the administrative point of view, standardization is necessary be­
cause the government does not have the capacity to tailor specific 
programs to meet individual peasant needs. Frequently the peasant 
does not get either the kind or amount of assistance which he believes 
he needs.
If the peasant was so dissatisfied with the program, why then 
did a substantial portion of the peasantry participate in Bimas? The 
press in Java has been quick to raise this question and has charged 
that force was used to override peasant opposition to the Bimas 
program. Press reports describing actual incidents in which force 
was used are corroborated by other sources. Obviously, government 
administrators and peasants have disagreed sharply about the policy 
and tactics of rural modernization.
Members of the civil service, particularly the pamong pradja 
have admitted privately that they frequently had to coerce farmers 
to participate in the Bimas program, though they rarely used overt 
force. The intonation used in a verbal command, or the general 
style of communication between the official and the peasant is 
enough to indicate that the government will not tolerate any public 
opposition. In the early stages of the program,therefore,the peasantry 
accepted Bimas. Such resignation is perhaps consistent with village 
tradition, but it was reinforced by the general feeling of insecurity 
and fear that followed the abortive communist coup of 1965. In the 
face of repeated disappointment with the results of the Bimas program, 
however, inhibitions against open dissent began to give way. The 
role of the press in this process should not be underestimated. It 
made public what many were thinking in private. Press criticism of 
the program, in turn, encouraged the political parties and the 
peasantry to become more aggressive.
The undercurrent of frustration with the Bimas program grew 
throughout 1969 , and became quite visible and potent at the beginning
3. It is important to mention that peasants frequently did not repay 
the credit even when yields were superior.
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of the 1970 dry season. Peasant resistance caused the government to 
try harder to increase communication with the countryside. In offi­
cial circles, there was a growing awareness that more resources would 
have to be allocated to explain the program to the farmer and per­
suade him to accept it.
While conducting research on the administration of the Bimas 
program in West Java, the author was able to participate in and 
observe the activities of Bimas officials as they tried to mobilize 
peasant support for the program. A team of government officials, 
representing the various agencies involved in Bimas at the kabupaten 
(district) level, were instructed to visit several ketjamatan (sub­
districts) and meet with their officials and peasants. The team was 
supposed to explain Bimas and then enlist the peasants' participation. 
Frequent4y, the kabupaten officials had already enrolled these 
ketjamatan in the Bimas program prior to the team's visit, and the 
arrival of the kabupaten team often represented the first effort to 
solicit peasant support. The kabupaten officials usually visited 
one ketjamatan a day, arriving in the early morning and returning 
home in the late afternoon. Five or six officials would comprise 
a team: one or two officials from the bupati's staff, one or two
from the agriculture department, one from PN Pertani (the government 
agency responsible for trucking the Bimas supplies to the village) 
and one from Bulog (Biro Urusan Logistik, the government agency 
responsible for the rice price support program and for collection 
of credit repayments).
Most of the visits occurred in the months of March and April 
1970. It is important to contact the peasants during these months 
so that Bimas deliveries can be made before dry season planting begins, 
in May and June. The peasants who attended the meetings, ideally, 
had been elected by the villagers. But in fact they were frequently 
appointed by the village chiefs (lurah) to represent their village 
in negotiations with Bimas officials.1* Those selected were called 
"unit leaders," and they were responsible for administering the 
Bimas project set for their village. This included making a list of 
participants, finding out from the various agencies when the Bimas 
materials would be delivered and then distributing these to the 
individual peasants. The unit leader performed a vital role; his 
position constituted the critical link between the impersonal 
bureaucracy, with its chain of command from Djakarta to the sub- 
district, and the peasant in the village, a communal entity often not 
fully incorporated into the state administrative structure. 4
4. This departure from official instructions occurred for several 
reasons. Frequently the lurah wanted to select one of his con­
fidants . either as a favor or to avoid the inconvenience of 
assemblying the farmers for an election. There were also instances 
where the farmers would elect a unit leader, but for some reason, 
he failed to meet the qualifications required by the lurah or the 
agriculture department. A replacement would then be selected by 
the lurah. As the Bimas program became less popular, farmers 
became less willing to serve as unit leaders. This obliged the 
lurah to select candidates from some of his more compliant 
constituents.
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The following is a report of what occurred in one kabupaten when 
the teams visited the ketjamatan. The particular kabupaten is located 
in the Priangan, the southern mountainous area of West Java. In 
these less accessible areas, villagers have been able, historically, 
to preserve a greater degree of autonomy from government control.
The reports illuminate quite well certain problems with the Bimas 
program, the approach which government officials take in implementing 
the program and the reaction of the peasantry to such government 
assistance. These formal encounters between middle level, urban 
officials and the subsistence level rural populace provide an in­
sight into the frustrations that arise when a government, intent upon 
altering time-honored patterns of land use, confronts a recalcitrant 
and tradition-bound peasantry.
II
Early in the morning I drove to the ketjamatan where I was to 
meet with the agricultural extension worker. Along with him and the 
tjamat, I went to the meeting hall next to the tjamat's office; here 
the special team from the kabupaten would explain the Bimas program 
for the current dry season. The meeting hall, like most buildings 
in the area, was a simple wooden structure with a peaked tile roof 
and a few glass panes for lighting. It consisted of one large room, 
approximately forty feet square. On the plank floor were five or 
six wooden benches upon which sat about fifteen to twenty farmers.
The farmers were all very lean and a little bent, appearing emaciated 
in their well-worn and drab-looking clothes. Some were young but 
most appeared over thirty-five. A few uniformed soldiers were sitting 
together on one of the benches. All were facing a large table at the 
front. Around this table sat the visiting team of officials and the 
members of the ketjamatan Muspida,5 in this instance, the tjamat, 
the local police chief and the local military commander. The 
meeting was opened by the tjamat, a striking and articulate man in 
his late thirties, a drop-out from the law faculty in Bandung. He 
had already served for ten years as tjamat and he introduced the 
kabupaten team with confidence and poise. Next he made a few remarks 
about Bimas. He stressed that only those villages with a good water 
supply could participate in Bimas during the dry season planting. 
Barring any dispute (sengketa) over water rights, the participating 
villages had already been chosen. He reminded the farmers that the 
fertilizer and other materials were not a gift from the government 
and that each individual peasant was responsible for the repayment 
of this credit. He underscored the fact that in deciding whether or 
not to accept Bimas aid, personal (pribadi) interests should not take
5. Muspida (Musjawarah Pimpinan Daerah or Regional Leadership Council) 
is a formal organizational device designed to coordinate the 
activities of civil, police and military authorities at the regional 
level. The specific function of each member remains unclear and 
this vagueness has left the door open for individual council members 
to define their own role. Not infrequently, as a result, a regional 
police or military commander gains the upper hand in the adminis­
tration of civil affairs. Civil officials, obviously, are irritated 
by such encroachment upon their domain and Muspida continues to 
be a controversial aspect of regional government in Indonesia.
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priority. "Do not just express your personal opinions on the Bimas 
matter, but open your minds to the condition of peasants in general.
Our peasants are in a very weak economic position. Bimas should there­
fore be considered a responsibility (tugas) of village cooperation 
(gotong-rojong). The peasant should feel obliged to accept Bimas.
The government is trying to assist us and so we should try to assist 
the government."
The tjamat then introduced the kabupaten representative of the 
Department of Agriculture. This official, an older man, stood and 
read from the bupatiTs letter of instruction (surat keputusan) which 
described in some detail the conditions of the Bimas program for the 
next dry season. The most important part was a description of the 
amount and kinds of materials (specifically, fertilizer, seeds and 
pesticides) to be provided, their cost and the terms of repayment 
to the government. After some fifteen minutes, he stopped reading.
He said that the contents of the Bimas package could not be varied 
too much because of the problems this would create in the administra­
tion of the program. He also stressed that the village unit could 
not be smaller than fifty hectares.6 7 8
The agricultural official then invited another member of the 
team to address the assembled peasants. This was a prominent farmer 
(tokoh tani) . well known for his use of modern techniques in rice 
cultivation. Well dressed and meticulously groomed, his urbane 
appearance contrasted sharply with that of the typical Indonesian 
peasant. (I learned later that, besides his farm, he also owned a 
home in Bandung, and that several of his children were living there 
while attending the University of Padjadjaran.) He started by saying,
6. The usual pattern in these meetings was for one official to read 
the formal letter of instruction from the bupati. Though a dull 
and tedious task, it had definite and important advantages. First, 
it emphasized that the instructions emanated from an important and 
authoritative source, i.e., the bupati. Second, by reading the in­
structions, the local official conveyed the impression that he was 
compelled to follow the commands and that, therefore, the peasant 
should not hold him accountable for the program. Third, since there 
were no copies of the instructions for distribution, this verbal 
communication was often the only detailed information which the 
peasant received.
7. Trying to profit from economies-of-scale, the government establish­
ed fifty hectares of contiguous plots as the minimum area to qualify 
for Bimas. Identified as the "block system," this stipulation was
a bone of contention between farmer and administrator. Some far­
mers felt that the regulation was a form of pressure, compelling 
those who opposed Bimas to accept it anyway in order not to deny 
their neighbors the program’s benefits.
8. Prominent peasants were invited to accompany the teams. This was 
in response to pressure by local parliamentary bodies demanding 
more opportunity for peasant participation in the implementation 
of the program. Bimas officials favored the idea, hoping it would 
enhance the program in the eyes of the peasants. The legislative 
bodies, however, wanted more peasant participation in order to 
curb bureaucratic excesses.
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MBimas really means social guidance (bimbingan masjarakat) because 
the problem of rice production is really a social problem. If all 
the peasants could just work together the problem could be overcome.” 
He felt that the marketing of rice needed to be improved, and he 
implied the government should assist more in this regard. He also 
suggested that the floor price in the new government rice subsidy 
should be raised to a level more compatible with peasant economic 
needs. Finally he was disturbed at reports that many peasants were 
not repaying the credit they had received through the Bimas program.
He said he did not know what to make of these reports and did not 
yet know if the peasant was responsible for this failure or if per­
haps other parties were involved. In spite of these problems, he 
asserted that the peasants should implement the government programs.
He asked rhetorically, "Why would a peasant want to reject the Bimas 
program?" He himself had participated in the program and had had 
some very high yields. "We, like the officials (petugas), are respon­
sible for the implementation of Bimas. We want the government to 
succeed."
The third member of the bupati's team to address the peasant 
assemblage was a man in his late twenties who represented PN Pertani, 
the government firm responsible for transporting the Bimas materials 
to the village. He said a few words of recognition to the Muspida 
and then launched into his talk by saying that PN Pertani was en­
countering many complications (simpang siur). He said that in one 
village in the ketjamatan, when PN Pertani delivered the fertilizer, 
no one knew who was the leader and who were the members of the unit. 
"It was not clear who was responsible for the unit. In general,
PN Pertani is not getting any advance information on road conditions 
or village storage facilities or even a complete list of participating 
peasants." He stressed that the unit leaders must provide this in­
formation. "Up until now the unit leaders have been too passive.
They should come directly to the local PN Pertani warehouse to re­
quest the Bimas materials. Sometimes the unit leader did not come 
and sometimes a person came that we did not know. We could only 
trust that he was submitting an honest list of applicants. Fre­
quently the form indicating that the village had received the 
materials was signed by the wrong person. Then we were forced to 
return to see if the delivery had been made. Sometimes the unit 
leader doesn!t inform the lurah that the material has arrived. Then 
an irate lurah shows up at our office asking why the delivery has 
not been made. Moreover, there are times when the unit leaders 
come to our office to request deliveries too late. Obviously we 
cannot be blamed for this." The tone of his voice and the manner of 
his speech clearly showed his annoyance with these problems. At 
several intervals he looked in the direction of the Muspida members 
and asked their forbearance for his discussion of such delicate 
matters. At one point he awkwardly turned to the tjamat and 
apologized for bringing the whole thing up at this meeting. He 
concluded by saying that "it was improper (tidak tepat) to mention 
these things but in this instance past experience could serve as a 
good teacher."
Next, the official from the Department of Agriculture completed 
reading the formal letter of instruction from the bupati. He then 
invited questions from the peasants. Three peasants raised their 
hands. The official first took their names down and then let them 
ask their questions. The first to stand was a little old man who
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probably weighed no more than a hundred pounds. It seemed as if only 
his pitji hat and his tattered but well-kept white shirt kept his 
sometimes tremulous frame from being engulfed by spotless but over­
sized baggy trousers. His stooped and anemic appearance was deceptive, 
for as soon as he spoke, one realized that he possessed a steadfast 
and iron-willed spirit. With exceptionally few utterances of defer­
ence, by Indonesian standards, to the team and ketjamatan leaders, 
he politely came directly to his point. His eyes were intently fixed 
upon the tokoh tani, who a few minutes before had asked why peasants 
would want ‘to reject the Bimas program. The old man, as his talk 
evolved, was obviously ruffled by this remark and its implication 
that peasants were being less than rational if they rejected Bimas.
He started by saying that he had participated in Bimas and that his 
yields had been low. "I then had to divide this between my tenants 
and also repay the government for the Bimas credits. This left me 
very little for my own needs.” He invited the tokoh tani to come to 
his farm and see for himself. The tokoh tani laughed anxiously, as 
did everyone else; his silent but incredulous facial expression seemed 
to ask why the old peasant was putting him on like this. Why should 
the old man have taken his remark so seriously? The old fellow, now 
gazing at the entire team, went on to say that Bimas was too burden­
some (terlalu berat). ”The yields are not sufficient to pay back the 
credit and leave me a satisfactory profit. I only want a portion of 
the Bimas package. I do not want the pesticides. The last time I 
used the Bimas pesticide, it killed the fish in the neighboring 
ponds.”9 He finished by saying that before one could expect a sub­
stantial increase in yields more attention would have to be given to 
improving the local irrigation system.10
The agricultural official gave a direct and brief rejoinder to 
these questions. He said there was little he could do about the 
price of the package contents. ”These decisions are made higher up 
in the administrative hierarchy.” Likewise, he could not change the 
regulation that the peasant must receive the full package.
A second peasant stood and asked some questions. He said that 
he would like to know on what basis the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakjat) determined the price of the package. He felt it was too 
theoretical. The peasant only needs fertilizer. He said that his 
area was free of pests. He requested that the pesticides be left out. 
He also felt that the technical assistance fee should not be paid by 
the peasant.11 He reiterated that the package price was too high and
9. The killing of fish in local ponds by Bimas pesticides frequently 
occurred in West Java. Some of the pesticides were highly toxic 
and,without proper precautionary measures, leakage from the 
treated areas entered fish ponds.
10. The new high yield seeds supplied in the Bimas package are 
more dependent than are conventional seeds upon a well-managed 
water supply. In many areas of West Java, Bimas projects were 
introduced before restoration of irrigation systems which had 
fallen into disrepair. This reduced the yield of the new seeds.
11. Included in the price of the package was a fee assessed for tech­
nical assistance. This was primarily used to pay salaries of techni­
cal advisers employed by foreign firms to plan and implement the 
Bimas program. The peasants found these fees objectionable because
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did not accord with the actual income of the peasant. He then went 
on to ask what he was supposed to do for his village. "At the be­
ginning of the last wet season (1969-1970), the Bimas materials were 
delivered, but only 50 percent of the peasants used them. The others 
did not want to participate in the program and now the village still 
has a large quantity of unused fertilizer and pesticides on hand.
I do not know what to do with this."12 13
The agricultural representative, now more diffident, responded 
by insisting that pesticides were not meant for use only when a rice 
field was attacked by pests. He stressed that pesticides should be 
used as a preventive measure before the pests appeared and therefore 
were an essential part of the package. He then went to the chalk 
board where the tjamat a few minutes before had listed the cost of 
the individual items. He said that the technical assistance fee 
was used to pay the salaries of the Japanese agricultural experts 
who were providing technical advice for the Bimas projects. It was 
also used for Indonesian university students who worked with the 
farmers and to finance the demonstration plots in the project areas.1 
The agricultural official then asked in disbelief if it was really 
true that the peasants had only used 50 percent of the Bimas material 
for the past wet season. The peasant simply replied that this was 
indeed the case. The official, annoyed and dismayed, reminded the 
peasant that several weeks of wet season planting time still remained 
and he urged that the village use the remaining material.
At this point the tjamat interrupted and asked that he be 
allowed to say a few words. He was obviously disturbed and piqued 
at the expressions of dissatisfaction coming from his constituents; 
now the revelation that one of his villages had been woefully 
negligent in its use of Bimas materials stirred him to speak. He 
immediately launched into an impassioned and demonstrative speech, 
admonishing the peasants for their shortsighted and irresponsible 
behavior and exhorting them to push on with the program. He insisted 
that land had a social function. "It is not a personal possession 
that can be used at will by the owner." He urged them to discharge 
their obligations as landowners because it was up to them to produce 
sufficient food for the population at large. He went on to ask the 
peasants about the total number of inhabitants in the ketjamatan in 
1940 and the total hectares of cultivated rice. He fired off an 
answer himself, giving the statistics and then asking for the situa­
tion in 1970. One of the peasants responded with data which
they did not receive any direct and visible assistance from these 
advisers. It only served to arouse their suspicion that perhaps 
the payment of the fee was not being used for its avowed purpose.
12. In the wet season of 1969-70, in many villages in West Java 
Bimas materials lay neglected in village warehouses because 
peasants failed to take their allotment. These peasants refused 
to participate even though local government authorities had al­
ready enrolled the village.
13. Students from the agricultural faculties at several universities 
in West Java were assigned to work with the peasants during the 
1970 dry season. Part of the technical assistance fee was used 
to pay their expenses while they lived in the villages.
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indicated an enormous increase in population but, because of urbani­
zation, a substantial decrease in hectareage. The difference over 
the thirty-year period was so large it provoked laughter at the ab­
surdity of the current condition as measured by the past.
Undaunted, the tjamat pleaded, "We desperately need to improve 
rice production. The government wants more responsibility (kewadjiban) 
on the part of the peasant and less concern with personal rights (hak- 
flak'). When the targets for rice production are achieved, then the 
peasant can worry about the pursuit of his rights. If your yield is 
four tons, try to increase it. Last week there were twenty births 
and only five deaths. The peasants are increasing the population and 
thus it is their responsibility to increase production." He asked 
them if the pantja usaha had been fully implemented and they answered 
that it Jiad not. * 4 * He lamented that it was natural to choose the 
easy road (djalan gang enteng). "If we had followed this pattern we 
would have never had a revolution or won our nationhood. It is 
natural to want few responsibilities and many rights. The experts 
say we can achieve four tons, but as human beings we say we can only 
reach two. If the doctor prescribes three pills a day it is natural 
for us to take only two."
He went on to say that the peasants were still following a free- 
for-all competitive system (sistim balap) in planting their rice. 
"Everyone plants according to his own interests and thus there is no 
regulation in the use of irrigation water. Because of this, villages 
more conveniently located near the irrigation system get more water 
and therefore more crops per year than other villages. Yet everyone 
has to pay the same tax. We must have better organization and leader­
ship among the peasants in order to surmount this problem." He told 
of one village that had built a dam cutting water off from an adjacent 
village and exclaimed that this had to be stopped.
The tjamat berated the peasants for coming late to PN Pertani to 
get materials. He said that he was disappointed with the reports he 
was receiving from the farmers. He wanted accurate reports. "We 
need honest farmers as well as honest administrators." Fertilizer 
on the local market was less expensive than that provided in the Bimas 
package, because some farmers falsified their reports, sayin^ they 
had one hectare of land when they only had one-half, and the^ sold 
the surplus to local vendors.
He pondered aloud why peasants were more disciplined in their 
repayment of debts to local money-lenders than of the Bimas credits. 
Again he mentioned the burgeoning population and growing unemployment 
and appealed to the peasants to work harder in order to make the 
program a success. He concluded by announcing the number of hectares
14. Pantja Usaha, the Five-Fold Way, is a well-known and frequently- 
voiced slogan that refers to the five ways to increase rice pro­
duction: (1) use of high yielding seeds; (2) proper fertilizer 
application; (3) adoption of improved cultivation practices;
(4) control of pests and diseases; and (5) efficient use of
irrigation water.
15. Many peasants who received Bimas materials sold a portion on the
open market.
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that would be included in the local Bimas program. He said the quota 
was larger than last time and that the peasant would have to work 
harder to achieve this goal.
Undeterred, the old peasant who had raised the first question 
calmly requested that he be heard again. The visiting agriculture 
official said that he did not have much time but that the man could 
say a few words. In a very contrite manner, the old fellow asked 
that his request be reviewed (tindjau kembali). He still felt that 
the program'was too much of a burden upon the peasant.
The meeting was about to be adjourned but the local agricultural 
extension worker asked to say a few words. This official, a bright 
young man, had a reputation for being a competent and dynamic civil 
servant. He stood and urged the peasants not to reject the Bimas 
program. He emphasized that Bimas represented an effort in mutual 
self-help (gotong rojong). He felt everything had been clarified by 
the letter of decision from the bupati and seemed annoyed that the 
attending peasants did not know about its contents, as if this some­
how reflected upon his performance as an extension worker. One 
peasant remarked that they had not yet seen the letter. The extension 
worker retorted, "I cannot do all the footwork; it is up to the peas­
ants to take more initiative in informing themselves about the 
program. The peasant should shoulder more responsibility for the 
administrative work.n
At this point the meeting was adjourned. The old peasant went 
directly to the tokoh tani and, with reticence and deference, 
apologized for his remarks. They engaged in the traditional gesture 
of respect, the tokoh tani retaining his hold of the peasant’s hand, 
gently drawing him near and then putting his arm around his shoulder.
A warm exchange of words ensued.
The peasants had made their exit by now, but several of the 
visiting team members and the tjamat remained seated at the front 
table. The tjamat lamented that because his ketjamatan had become 
so urbanized he had little time to spend supervising the Bimas 
program. The tokoh tani remarked that the government floor price on 
rice was too low. The others agreed that it needed to be raised in 
order to provide an incentive to the peasant to increase his produc­
tion. The tjamat said that although the government was more in­
terested than before in improving the lot of the peasant, the 
Bimas program had yet to accomplish this goal. "There are a lot 
of problems with the program and it is not popular with the 
peasants." He feared that their discontent with the program would 
be directed at conscientious men like himself who represented 
the civil bureaucracy. Then in a more pensive mood, but without 
obvious forethought, he observed that this could contribute 
to the return of the BTI.16
16. BTI or Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Organization) 
mobilized peasant support for the communist movement. It was 
destroyed along with other communist groups in the aftermath 
of the abortive 1965 coup.
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I I I
On the second visit, the team members were different from those 
I had accompanied on the first visit. Together we crowded into a small 
jeep and for the next hour travelled along a winding road before final­
ly arriving at the tjamatfs office. We were led into the public meet­
ing hall next to the office. It was a small structure still under 
construction with dirt floors and wooden benches. At one end of the 
room, behind a waist-high partition, the team was seated along with 
the ketjamatan Muspida. On the other side of the partition thirty to 
forty farmers sat on rows of wooden benches. Like the other farmers, 
their gaunt and unexpressive faces betrayed their hard existence.
Several among them were obvious because of their well-groomed appear­
ance. "Two were lurah from the two villages that were prospective re­
cipients of the Bimas program. Two others were also conspicuous by 
virtue of their more polished appearance. These two soon proved the 
most active participants in the meeting, and I discovered later that 
they were young university trained teachers from the local school 
system.
The tjamat stood and opened the meeting with the announcement 
that the lurah should come to his office next week to receive instruc­
tions about levying the land tax. The tjamat, his voice barely audible, 
seemed noticeably insecure in his position of authority. He was under the 
age of thirty and had recently graduated from the tjamat school in 
Bandung. It was his second year as a member of the civil service. He 
provided a sharp contrast with the more mature and self-confident 
posture of the army and police representatives of the local Muspida, 
who sat next to him. The tjamat introduced the members of the team.
The first member to speak was an official from the bupatifs office.
He was also a young man, a recent graduate of the tjamat school in 
Bandung, who, until transferred to the bupatifs office, had served 
two years as a tjamat. He calmly explained that, "It is very important 
for the peasant to understand the goal of the Bimas program. The 
population is increasing and food is needed to support it. The 
government must increase rice production." He concluded with the 
statement that, "The government is trying transmigration and birth 
control, but this is not sufficient to overcome the population problem.
The Bimas program constitutes a critical part of the effort."
At this point, one of the young school teachers asked for an 
agenda of the meeting. The kabupaten official obligingly listed a 
five-point agenda on the chalk board. The school teacher persisted, 
asking for a clarification on point five of the agenda. Point five 
was listed as "general survey" (pandangan umum). The teacher stressed 
that he wanted to make sure that the peasants had a chance to ask 
questions, and he requested that point five be changed to "questions 
and answers" (tanja-djawab). The official eagerly complied, and then 
reassured the teacher that the peasants would have a chance to in­
quire about the program. He stressed that the meeting would be con­
ducted in a democratic manner and apologized for the partition 
separating the team from the peasants.
Another kabupaten official rose and gave a lengthy explanation 
of the Bimas program. He read from the bupati’s letter of instruc­
tion and diagrammed the Bimas organizational structure on the chalk 
board, defining the role of each participating agency. He concluded
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by stressing the need for the perfection of the pantja usaha as a 
means of improving farming techniques. At this point several peas­
ants abruptly interposed questions. One said that in the past the 
lurah had announced that the village would receive Bimas and thus 
many peasants felt compelled to accept the program. He wanted to 
know if this would be repeated. The kabupaten official assured him 
that compulsion would not be used. Apparently not content with this 
response, one of the school teachers inquired about the issue of 
coercion and metaphorically compared the peasant to a patient who 
needed an injection. He asserted that, "The patient would voluntarily 
submit himself for treatment and that the same should apply to the 
Bimas program.” The official agreed and said that he welcomed 
criticism concerning the program. Another peasant said he was afraid 
that if they rejected Bimas it would be interpreted as an attack on 
the five year plan. He said his lurah had been the one who submitted 
the request for Bimas, and he implied that this did not reflect the 
desires of the peasants.
The team member from the argiculture department then rose to 
address the peasants. He stressed that the decision to have Bimas 
was not just the choice of a lurah or a tjamat. "Bimas is a national 
effort. The government intends to achieve a balance between popula­
tion growth and food production." He then launched into a lengthy 
technical explanation of the pantja usaha and its application to rice 
farming. He was followed by an official from PN Pertani who gave a 
brief explanation of the role of his agency in the delivery of 
Bimas materials.
The meeting had now reached point five of the agenda, the ques­
tion and answer period. One of the school teachers quickly rose and 
opened a folder of newspaper clippings. For the next twenty minutes 
he quoted excerpts from President SuhartoTs speeches concerning 
the Bimas program. He was quite emotional; his aggressive and 
vehement manner contrasted sharply with the usually subdued way of 
speaking in Sundanese society. The excerpts he quoted were related 
to two themes. One, that the peasant needed an incentive in the 
form of an effective price support policy, and two, that force 
should not be used in the implementation of the program. There 
should be a dialogue between the peasant and the government so that 
the program could be executed in a democratic manner. After reading 
the excerpts, he spoke directly with the team. "The team has only 
mentioned the positive aspects of the Bimas program. Everything you 
said was just great, but it was in direct contradiction with what has 
actually happened in our ketjamatan. We have already participated in 
the Bimas program but at no time have we received any assistance 
from the agricultural extension service." He then opened his file 
again and read a detailed definition of the pantja usaha, after ex­
plaining that he had gotten this from the Agriculture Institute in 
Bogor. He reminded the team that all five elements of the pantja 
usaha must be included in the program. As if to assuage his own 
anxiety about this bluntness, he reiterated that the meeting could 
only be productive if he continued to speak frankly (blak-blakan).
He then read a report,which he said came from the local land 
department, which analyzed the soil composition of his ketjamatan.
The report indicated that the soil was deficient in phosphate.
But so far, the Bimas program had not included this in the package, 
though it would have to do so if rice production were to be increased. 
He concluded by requesting that a team of civil servants be sent as
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observers in order to reduce the chances for corruption in local Bimas 
administration. He then returned to his original point that the 
agricultural extension service needed vast improvement. nThe Bimas 
program could be improved through field demonstrations. This would 
help overcome peasant dissatisfaction.”
The other school teacher now stood and began to talk about his 
own past experiences with Bimas. In his observations of the program, 
he had never seen any extension service given to the peasant. ”The 
officials are only concerned that we accept Bimas; they give no 
assistance on how to use the fertilizer, seed, etc. In some cases 
peasants are even intimidated into participation. Some instructions 
are given to the officials and unit leaders on how to use the materi­
als but this information is never conveyed to most peasants.” He 
concluded by saying that in order to organize the Bimas program proper­
ly in this ketjamatan, it would be necessary to cancel Bimas for the 
upcoming dry season and concentrate instead on adequately instructing 
the peasant for the following year.
Again the agricultural official on the team rose to defend the 
program. He said it was difficult to provide such instruction be­
cause there were only one or two extension workers per ketjamatan. 
’’According to the records, this ketjamatan had the best potential 
for increased production [the implication being that the peasants 
should therefore not be so dependent upon outside assistance]. Last 
year the extension service did not have the funds to conduct courses 
for the farmers, but this year money will be provided. Nevertheless, 
several times villages were notified in advance that an extension 
worker was coming,but when he arrived, he found no one had assembled 
the peasants.” He called on those present to organize a meeting and 
ask for an extension worker. He himself would come if invited.
Finally, the school teacher who had read Suharto’s speeches 
stood and made a few concluding remarks. ’’Until now we have not 
received any information (penjuluhan) about the proper use of the 
Bimas package. As a result, the yields have not been good and now 
the peasants are in debt to the government. They find it difficult 
to repay the credit and at the same time earn enough to meet their 
basic needs.” He reminded the team members that Bimas stands for 
bimbingan massal, that is, guidance.
At this point, the meeting adjourned. After a brief lunch, we 
drove back to the kabupaten office. On the way, the team members 
talked about the meeting. One said, ’’The peasants know about modern 
farming techniques but only from books. They do not know how to 
apply this knowledge in their daily work. They want guidance.”
Another member remarked that the kaum intelektuil (intellectual 
group), meaning the two school teachers, was certainly active in the 
meeting. Another said that Bimas was becoming a political issue;
’’One of the lurah who attended the meeting wanted a team sent to his 
village in order to convince the peasants to accept Bimas. The 
village was not on the bupati’s list to receive Bimas for this dry 
season. The lurah thought that absence from the list meant that the 
bupati was dissatisfied with his past performance. Eager to correct 
this image, the lurah thought that a visiting team could persuade 
the peasants to continue with Bimas.” They all chuckled because 
the lurah had looked rather bewildered and distressed after the meet­
ing, because his constituents obviously did not back his request.
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The official added that the bupati was not in fact disappointed with 
the lurah. The village had not been included because the farmers were 
still in debt from past Bimas programs.17
IV
The civil servants on the third trip differed from those on the 
first two trips. We drove to the ketjamatan and assembled in the 
meeting hall next to the tjamatTs office. I had visited this 
ketjamatan eight months before in September 1969. Most of the villages 
here had participated at one time or another in the Bimas program and 
I had gone there to study the results. There are seven villages in 
the ketjamatan, and it is considered one of the most progressive and 
prosperous areas in the kabupaten. For the dry season of 1969, only 
one village had decided to participate in the Bimas program. The 
rest did not want to continue because they had found that Bimas 
participation did not bring a significant rise in production. They 
saw several reasons for this. The Bimas materials frequently arrived 
late or they were unsuitable for local conditions. In addition, the 
program was beset with administrative confusion because of problems 
encountered in credit repayment.18 Thus, except for this one village, 
the ketjamatan*s peasants chose to remain outside the program.
In September 1969, I had visited the participating village. I 
was astonished by what I saw. The entire rice area of the village, 
over 100 hectares, had been cultivated using Bimas materials.
Planting was done in May and June, so that when I arrived in September 
the rice plants were well above the ground though they had not 
achieved their full growth. Yet the stalks were not green, they were 
prematurely brown because of a lack of water. The entire crop was 
a total disaster because of draught. It was a strange sensation to 
drive along the road gazing at these fields where several months 
before peasants were painstakingly planting the seedlings row-by-row 
in the muddy sawah, which at that time was submerged in several 
inches of water. Now the critical ingredient, water, had vanished, 
exposing the parched cracked soil of the sawah floor. The peasants 
had also vanished from the scene. Their work in vain, they abandoned 
this crop to its predetermined fate. Now they would wait for the 
next planting cycle several months ahead.
17. Some bupati decided not to continue with Bimas if villages were in 
debt from former Bimas programs. They feared that continuation 
would make the debt so large that the government would never be 
repaid.
18. Adequate records had not been kept and there was much corruption 
or leakage of payments as they were channeled from the peasant 
up the bureaucratic hierarchy. It frequently occurred that
the government had no way of knowing if the peasant had defaulted 
on the payments or if portions of the payments had been embezzled 
by the officials. Many peasants were resentful that government 
commissions had been inquiring to see if they had repaid the 
credit. They felt that the officials had not been consistent 
in recording their payments.
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I went to the lurah's home and we discussed the Bimas program and 
its failure in his village. He explained, "We accepted Bimas on the 
understanding that we would receive a pump. There is a river about 
500 yards from the village and the pump would feed water into the 
rice fields. We had always had a problem getting enough water in 
the dry season, and it would have been risky to accept Bimas with­
out a pump. The promise of the pump gave us an added incentive to 
accept Bimas, namely the pump would be a permanent possession; also 
it would give some reasonable assurance that the Bimas project would 
succeed. However, when it came time to start the program, the Bimas 
materials came minus the pump. The pump never did come, and, because 
of draught, the crop will not be harvested." The lurah felt there 
would be no redress since the promise of the pump had not been writ­
ten into the contract between the village and the government.19 I 
asked what the villagers would do without the income from the dry 
season crop. He said that many of the men would probably go to the 
city nearby and look for temporary employment. Many would work as 
betjak (pedicab) drivers.
This had been the scene in September 1969. At that time, peas­
ants in the non-Bimas villages feared that persistent refusal to 
accept the program would not be tolerated and that in the near future 
they would be forced to participate. Now it was April, and I was 
visiting this same ketjamatan. Apparently some of the peasants had 
become more favorable to Bimas. I was alerted to this change of 
heart in March when I met with the extension worker from this area.
He said that some wanted Bimas because he had been able to arrange 
a Bimas package which included a special pesticide highly valued by 
the peasants. In accompanying the kabupaten team I would have a 
chance to see whether in fact the peasants genuinely desired to try 
Bimas again.
The meeting hall had the standard features of such buildings 
and, at first glance, the twenty-five peasants seated inside lacked 
any distinctive characteristics that might have set them apart from 
other peasant groups in this mountainous region. The team joined the 
Muspida members seated in the front. The tjamat was absent on busi­
ness in the city nearby. One of the visiting team members, a recent 
graduate of the tjamat school in Bandung and now an administrative 
assistant to the bupati, introduced his companions. Then another 
team member, an older man, who also worked in the buapti!s office and 
had already served for many years as a tjamat, explained the objec­
tive of the Bimas program. He read for about fifteen minutes from 
the bupatifs letter of instruction concerning the organizational and 
financial features of the Bimas program. Upon completing this state­
ment, he talked about the problem of peasants not repaying the credit. 
"The debt is running into the millions of rupiahs and the governor 
wants to get this money back. A special committee has been set up 
to find out why the peasants are not paying. The investigation will 
look into the affairs of both peasants and officials." He reassured 
them that legal action would be taken against officials involved in 
corruption (penjelewengan) .
19. There were numerous reports in 1969-1970 that villages had been 
promised pumps as part of their acceptance of Bimas but that 
the pumps had never arrived.
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Then the agricultural official rose to speak. He emphasized that 
the peasant is responsible for improving his life and fulfilling the 
requirements of the pantja usaha. He stressed that measures should 
be taken to protect the rice plants before pests attack. Improved 
methods of planting and irrigation were explained and advice given 
on using fertilizer at the proper times and in the proper amount.
He also urged the peasants to use the best seeds. The PN Pertani 
official gave a few brief remarks indicating that the peasants must 
improve the way in which they request Bimas help. Many of the 
applications had been submitted late. He was followed by the tokoh 
tani, who said that the government needed to increase production and 
this was the reason behind the Bimas program. At the same time, 
however, he intimated that the government had better introduce a more 
effective price support policy if it expected rice production to 
increase.
Then the question and answer period began. It lasted for about 
an hour. The first peasant to speak was exceptionally well dressed 
and well groomed. In the pocket of his new white shirt there was a 
gleaming ball point pen, the only one in evidence among the peasants. 
The forceful personality of this young man dominated the questioning. 
He spoke with ease about the finer technical points of farming, and 
one of the team members, obviously impressed, remarked in an aside 
to a companion that this was indeed a rare thing to witness. The 
young peasant proceeded to decry the fact that, even though the 
peasants received Bimas assistance, there still was little incentive 
to increase production. He firmly asserted several times that an 
increase in production was inextricably linked with a more favorable 
price support system. "Unless the government undertakes more effec­
tive action in this area, Bimas will not fare well. We, the peasants 
in this ketjamatan, must organize to fight for this goal."
A second peasant stood and asked that the amount of pesticide 
be decreased and the fertilizer allowance increased. The well-dressed 
peasant spoke up in support of this. He said the peasants were 
accustomed to using more fertilizer than they got through the Bimas 
program. He also requested that some aid be given to the villages 
to help meet the administrative costs of implementing Bimas.20 "In 
the past, Bimas fertilizer was delivered at a point far from the 
village because the trucks could not traverse the village roads. It 
was difficult to find the financial resources to transport it to the 
village. In addition, the delivered fertilizer was frequently less 
than was promised. There was some leakage along the way. The lurah 
was supposed to record the loss so a claim could be submitted, but 
frequently he did not."21
20. The government expected the peasants to pay these expenses; 
whereas the peasants demanded that the government share in the 
costs. The costs usually involved transport expenses, rental fees 
for a warehouse and a token salary for the unit leader and his 
assistants.
21. There were numerous reports about fertilizer deliveries which 
were less than those prescribed for the program. Even after the 
fertilizer did arrive, some people took portions of it as a pay­
ment for services rendered in administering the program. The 
individual peasant frequently did not receive his full allotment.
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The agricultural official responded that there was nothing he 
could do to alter the package in line with local preferences. He 
regretted to say that there were no funds available to defray village 
level administrative costs. He urged them to collect funds by re­
building the farmer cooperative movement.22
The well-dressed peasant, now openly perturbed over the lack of 
peasant organization, seemed to be directing his remarks more to the 
assembled peasants than to the team. He said that there was a definite 
need for some kind of peasant organization and it was about time some­
thing was done about it. "I do not identify with any particular 
political party, and I would like to see the peasants build an organiza 
tion independent of the parties." Another peasant, an old shoeless 
fellow, wearing black pants and shirt, said that his village used to 
have a cooperative but it fell apart when the government devalued the 
currency in 1965. He went on to say that he was not particularly 
interested in receiving the Bimas credits because the contents of the 
package did not accord with his wishes. He asked that he might be 
made exempt from having to participate. One of the kabupaten 
officials sympathetically said that this request would be granted.
At this point, the meeting adjourned and for a brief period I 
talked with the well-dressed and outspoken peasant. He said that up 
until five years ago he had been an urban businessman. But then 
he decided to try his hand at commercial farming. He found it dif­
ficult to succeed given the lack of a favorable rice subsidy. He did 
emphasize, however, that in general the peasants in his area and those 
at this meeting wanted to try Bimas again. They liked the pesticides 
they were now receiving through Bimas. He said that the area's 
peasants were well educated and they felt they could make a profit 
with Bimas this dry season. He stressed, however, that they would not 
want to have Bimas in the wet season because the price of rice tends 
to decline during that period.
V
These three episodes provide some corrective to national level 
views of the peasants' response to Bimas. Some peasants did believe 
the program was helpful, but for the majority, it was an unwelcomed 
intrusion into their village economy. While the government bureauc­
racy was able to cow most of these peasants into accepting Bimas, this 
same bureaucracy was not sufficiently staffed to instruct and supervise 
them in the application of the new technology. As a consequence, 
yields continued to remain below the predicted targets and only a 
small portion of the credit extended by the government was being repaid
The increasing unpopularity of Bimas, the disappointing yields 
and the losses incurred by the government treasury--all culminated in 
an incognito visit to the rice fields by Suharto in April 1970. This 
unprecedented action was an effort by Suharto to find the reality 
that ambiguous bureaucratic reports had shrouded in confusion
22. A government sponsored cooperative movement was started in Java in 
1961. By 1968,for political and economic reasons, the cooperative 
movement was ineffective in most villages.
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and misunderstanding. Disguised in the modest garb of an urban 
dweller, the President, along with several of his aides, visited 
villages in West and Central Java, talking informally about Bimas 
with individual peasants. It was soon apparent that the peasants 
harbored serious grievances towards Bimas. In the following month, 
Suharto made the crucial decision to abandon the current Bimas 
program. The official press statement justified the decision on 
grounds that the government was now financially capable of operating 
its own program without the participation of foreign companies. Yet, 
few informed observers would deny that the decision really represented 
Suharto's loss of confidence in the merits of the Bimas program. This 
must have been a difficult decision for the President, who has taken 
a personal interest in Bimas. His government had extolled the 
virtues of the program. Many officials seemed confident that the 
massive infusion of fertilizer and other materials plus the assistance 
of the foreign companies would turn the tide in rice production in 
Indonesia. But only a year later, these hopes were dashed.
The significant issue now concerns reform of the program and 
devising new policies to boost rice production. In June and July, 
higher level government officials were busily engaged in preparing 
a new Bimas program for the oncoming wet season, which began in 
September and October 1970. The urgency of this deadline and the 
awesome task of achieving the 1973 self-sufficiency goal loomed 
large in the minds of these men. Such pressures did not exactly 
provide the most desirable environment for carefully reviewing and 
formulating new programs. The new program that did emerge contained 
some definite improvements. Most importantly, instead of relying 
exclusively on central planning and the public bureaucracy, the 
government was now willing to leave some initiative to the peasant 
and to allocate the Bimas materials through the open market.23 This 
represents an important concession and expands the opportunity for 
the peasant to adapt the services of the new Bimas program to his 
own particular needs. Nevertheless, the size of the Bimas program 
remains massive and government agencies have yet to demonstrate their 
capacity to implement it. One cannot predict the outcome with any 
confidence. The issue still hangs in doubt as to whether the 
Indonesian government can break with its past record of ill-starred 
performance and achieve self-sufficiency by 1973.
23. One still outstanding issue concerns the price support policy 
for rice production, an issue of great concern to the peasants. 
In the spring of 1970, the government was introducing policies 
to establish the basic framework for a subsidy program, but the 
administrative problems involved in this program are formidable 
and it remains to be seen if these policies will provide a 
greater incentive for increasing rice production.

